INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's historic decision in United States v. Windsor 1 is striking for, among other things, the conspicuous absence of the words "homosexual," "lesbian," or "bisexual." In place of these characters, Windsor introduces us to the new legal homosexual 2 : the "same-sex couple." 3 In June of 2013, in this much-celebrated decision, the Court invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage, for federal purposes, as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." 4 The Court held that this definition violates the Fifth Amendment and interferes "with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages." 5 Windsor completed a three-decade transformation of the legal homosexual from an individual whose sexual conduct the state could punish as morally blameworthy, 6 to a couple whose marriage the State can find "worthy of dignity."
7 What enabled this tremendous moral and legal transition? Why have the terms "homosexual," "lesbian," and "bisexual" disappeared with the arrival of Windsor's dignity? This Article explores the remarkable journey of the legal homosexual over the last three decades, with a particular focus on the legal and cultural meanings of the Court's recent Windsor decision. The Article reveals how, in three decades, the Court shifted along three key dimensions in its attitude to the legal homosexual: (1) its characterization of the legal homosexual; (2) its moral evaluation of the legal homosexual; and (3) its position on whether and how the state can engage in pure 2014]
Conferring Dignity 247
The metamorphosis culminates in the "Dignified Married Couple Phase" launched by Windsor. 16 In this pivotal opinion, the Court validated the decision of several states to "confer" on homosexuals "a dignity and status of immense import." 17 The legal homosexual has now turned into a dignified "same-sex couple," and the terms "homosexual," "lesbian," and "bisexual" have virtually disappeared. These four phases mark the progression of the legal homosexual. 18 Part II examines three conditions that have enabled this moral progress of the legal homosexual: (1) desexualization; (2) privatization; and (3) coupling and reproduction. It shows how these three conditions crystallized in the three post-Bowers cases discussed in Part I. Part III critically examines Windsor's weak dignity, exploring both its role in the opinion and its problematic features. The Article concludes with some reflections on how future courts and advocates can apply the landmark decision of Windsor to enhance civil rights while sidestepping the weakness of its dignity.
I. A MORAL METAMORPHOSIS: FROM BOWERS TO WINDSOR
From the moral and legal condemnation of homosexual sodomy in Bowers, we have arrived at the moral and legal dignity of "same-sex couples" in Windsor. How has the morally bad legal homosexual of Bowers turned-in three short decades-into the morally good married couple of Windsor? This Part examines, in four steps, the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.
A. Phase One: The Immoral Sodomite
Bowers is our starting point. This decision has been condemned as a grave mistake 19 -the Lawrence majority even declared it incorrect from the moment it was decided. 20 Yet revisiting Bowers is critical for our understanding of the present. The current "goodness" of some forms of homosexuality (e.g., same-sex marriage), as reflected in Windsor, can be fully understood only through the past legal and historical "badness" of other forms of homosexuality (e.g., homosexual sodomy), as reflected in Bowers.
Three overlapping themes in Bowers shape the Court's understanding of homosexuality. First, the legal homosexual was understood by the Bowers
248
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37 majority primarily through his illicit sexuality, as a deviant sodomite. Second, the Bowers Court, and especially Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, accepted Georgia's characterization of homosexual conduct as immoral. Third, the Court perceived statutory moral condemnation of homosexual conduct as legitimate.
"Committing that Act"
The Bowers Court viewed the legal homosexual primarily through the lens of sexual conduct. 21 Although sodomy, as defined by the Georgia statute at the time, could have been-and surely was-committed by heterosexual couples, 22 the Court's portrayal of the crime focused on homosexual sodomy. 23 Notably, in Bowers the distinction between homosexual acts and homosexual identities is far from clear. 24 The Bowers majority at times discussed "the homosexual" as a type of person (an identity), 25 but at other times focused on "homosexual sodomy" (an act). 26 As Janet Halley has argued, Bowers reflects multiple strategic slippages between the framework of homosexual sodomy and that of homosexual identity. 27 Under both para- 21 For a similar perspective, see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118-19 (1967) (affirming the deportation of an immigrant on the ground that federal law barred entry of those "afflicted with psychopathic personality," which the Immigration and Naturalization Service interpreted to include all homosexuals) (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990)). 22 See Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-2(a)(1) (1984) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.") 23 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used."); Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 439 (1997) (arguing that Bowers was written from a heterosexual standpoint, such that heterosexual sodomy could be deemed invisible or forgotten). 24 For a general distinction between act and identity, see Michel Foucault's now-famous observation in the first volume of his History of Sexuality: "As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life . . . [T] he homosexual was now a species." 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HIS-TORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978) . 25 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.") (emphasis added). 26 See, e.g., id. at 187-88 ("In August 1982, respondent Hardwick . . . was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent's home.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
27 Janet E. Halley 
Moral Condemnation of Homosexual Conduct
The legal homosexual was portrayed in Bowers as an immoral legal persona. 29 This was made most explicit in Chief Justice Burger's famous concurrence, which is dedicated in its entirety to justifying the moral condemnation of homosexual conduct. 30 Chief Justice Burger underscored the majority's finding that "the proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots, '" 31 and that regulation of "homosexual conduct" has been ongoing "throughout the history of Western civilization." 32 Therefore, he concluded, " [t] o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 33 The assumption here was that ancient anti-homosexual moral teachings were still relevant in our times. Otherwise, there would be no problem "casting them aside."
A similar, though less explicit, moral critique of homosexuality underlay Justice White's opinion for the majority. Justice White rejected the claim that the Court's previous privacy jurisprudence should apply to homosexual sodomy. 34 
The Legitimacy of Morals Legislation
Finally, the Court had to decide whether, in the absence of a "fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy," 48 the state could show a rational basis for its law. The plaintiffs had argued that there was none, "other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." 49 But the Court was satisfied with moral disapproval of homosexual conduct as grounds for legislation. "The law," Justice White asserted, "is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." 50 Laws, according to Bowers, may be legitimate when based on moral beliefs of the majority of the population, even when these laws regulate victimless behavior such as consensual sodomy. 
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In sum, in three steps the Bowers majority affirmed a state prohibition on sexual sodomy. First, the Court centered its discussion on sexual conduct, describing the legal homosexual as one who commits sodomy. Second, the Court accepted the moral condemnation of the legal homosexual, distinguishing homosexual sodomy from socially valuable activities such as marriage, procreation, and the education of children. Third, the Court affirmed Georgia's right to engage in pure morals legislation.
B. Phase Two: The Equal Homosexual Class
One decade later, in Romer v. Evans, 51 the Court confronted the legal homosexual again. In this phase, the "Equal Homosexual Class Phase," three related changes occurred. First, the legal homosexual was now recast as a member of a protected class of citizens. Second, the moral evaluation of the legal homosexual significantly shifted from moral condemnation to moral neutrality. Third, the Court's previous deference to pure morals legislation was significantly weakened by the new anti-animus principle. I will examine each aspect in turn.
The Homosexual Class
A ghost opens the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans. It is the ghost of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 invoked through Justice Harlan's dissenting protest that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
53 At stake in Romer was Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, 54 which repealed discrimination protections on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." 55 This, according to the Court, subjected an entire homosexual class to "discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation." 56 As Justice Kennedy explained, "The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination . . . ." 57 60 Indeed, from Romer onward, the legal homosexual will be consistently de-sexualized.
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In Romer, the legal homosexual was transformed from a sexual sodomite into a "class of citizens" 62 and a "single named group." 63 Ten years after Bowers, the Court portrayed homosexuality not as individual deviant sex acts, but as a "single trait" that causes a distinct group of people to suffer from animus and discrimination. 64 One could argue that this shift of focus from sex acts to class reflects only the different nature of the legal conflicts in Romer and Bowers. But as Justice Scalia rightly pointed out, Romer's class of citizens is made of the same individuals whose sex acts the state could legitimately criminalize under Bowers. 65 As we shall now see, this shift of focus from homosexual sodomy to a "class of citizens" was not purely semantic-it critically enabled a judicial reassessment of the moral value of homosexuals.
Moral Neutrality Toward the Homosexual Class
The Romer majority did not opine on whether homosexuals are morally good or morally bad people. 66 Instead, the Court declared a "commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake." 67 This commitment to neutrality, Romer explains, is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause. 68 The Court pointed to concrete harms of discrimination against the homosexual class, 69 underscoring that Amendment 2 "imposes a special dis- Amendment 2, according to Romer, "seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects." 74 Thus, "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 75 The will to injure another group via legislation will not be tolerated by the Court.
In 1996, with Bowers still a binding precedent, Romer's articulation of the anti-animus principle depended on the premise that homosexuals constitute a class of citizens and not an aggregation of sodomites. Justice Scalia thus objected by shifting the discussion back to sodomy. 76 (1996) ("The underlying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual behavior. The state must justify discrimination on some other, public-regarding ground."). 74 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 75 Id. at 633. 76 See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of 'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers."). [Vol. 37 proval of homosexual conduct is a legitimate state interest under Bowers, Scalia argued, such disapproval should also be viewed as permissible grounds for state laws such as Amendment 2. 77 The majority did not agree. In short, the second phase of the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual, the "Equal Homosexual Class Phase," involved three interrelated shifts. First, the Court now characterized the legal homosexual as a member of a class and not as an individual sexual sodomite. Second, the moral status of homosexuals in the eyes of the Court improved from condemnation to neutrality. Third, the idea that animus cannot motivate state legislation weakened the deference to state morals legislation established in Bowers. We will now see how these factors developed in the third phase of the metamorphosis.
C. Phase Three: The Free Intimate Bond
In Lawrence, the Court once again considered the validity of a sodomy statute, 78 and this time found it unconstitutional. 79 The Court recognized the liberty interest in an enduring intimate bond. 80 Three related shifts occurred here. First, the legal homosexual was now represented as an enduring intimate bond. Second, that intimate bond was characterized by the Court as socially valuable. Third, the Court undermined the ability of states to enact pure morals legislation.
The Enduring Intimate Bond
Lawrence famously opens with the declaration that "[l]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places." 81 It is a private liberty. 82 Lawrence not only rejected Bowers' framing of the legal issue;
83 it also presented the legal homosexual in an entirely new way. The legal homosexual was now understood as "two persons of the same sex . . . engag [ing] in certain intimate sexual conduct." 79 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 80 See id. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice."). 81 Id. at 562. 82 See infra Part II.B. 83 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 84 Id.
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So while the facts and the legal question in Bowers and Lawrence were seemingly analogous, 85 their characterizations of the legal homosexual were strikingly different. The Bowers Court conceptualized sodomy as individual criminal acts. By contrast, the Lawrence Court viewed it as an act of sexual intimacy. This recasting of the legal homosexual as an intimate bond is conceptually tied to Lawrence's positing of liberty as a right that protects private conduct from state intrusion. 86 I will return to this point. 87 Let us now see how the new framing of the legal homosexual affected the Court's moral appraisal of homosexuality.
Moral Recognition of the Enduring Intimate Bond
The shift of attention from "homosexual conduct" to an "enduring intimate bond" laid the groundwork for the Court's rejection of Bowers' assumption that homosexuality is not socially valuable. 88 Instead, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, emphasized that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education."
89 Quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 90 Justice Kennedy invoked the dignity to make intimate life choices as articulated in the abortion context: These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 85 But not all homosexual conduct was considered socially valuable in Lawrence. Justice Kennedy's decision drew a clear line between legitimate and illegitimate sexual conduct. Forms of sex involving minors, injury or coercion, public conduct, or prostitution were all treated as morally and legally blameworthy.
98 By contrast, the private conduct of two consenting adults drew no censure. 99 Indeed, in Lawrence, such private conduct rose to a level of moral validation that is more robust than the simple moral neutrality of Romer. With terms such as "dignity," 100 "respect," 101 and the "mystery of human life," 102 the Court signaled moral recognition and validation of a certain type of legal homosexual: the one who has entered an intimate bond with another. 91 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 92 Id. 93 Id. 94 Id. at 567; see also id. ("The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right" to choose to enter upon relationships "in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.") (emphasis added). 95 
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The "End of Morals Legislation"?
The Lawrence majority thus embraced one of the primary claims of twentieth-century legal positivism: the State should not be in the business of pure morals legislation. 103 Even if condemnation of homosexuality is sometimes based on "profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles," the majority of the population can no longer enforce its moral views through criminal law.
104 "The liberty of all" prevails over the moral convictions of the many, 105 and "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."
106 Thus Bowers was overruled. 107 Justice Scalia objected. 108 He criticized the majority for taking sides in a "culture war," 109 and warned that there were many morals-based state laws that would now be hard to defend, including "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity. In sum, in the third phase of our metamorphosis we find three main developments. First, the depiction of the legal homosexual has transformed into an enduring intimate bond that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the moral value of this bond has increased from moral neutrality toward the homosexual class, to a moral validation and recognition of the enduring intimate bond. Third, after Lawrence, moral condemnation in and of itself can no longer justify criminal prohibitions on private sexual behavior.
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D. Phase Four: The Dignified Married Couple
In 2013, the Windsor Court struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment. 113 Windsor is a fascinating social and legal development, even a culmination, in the moral transformation of the legal homosexual. It reflects a three-decade shift of the legal homosexual from a morally condemned persona to a morally good and dignified one. The Court does this mostly through a novel use of the concept of dignity.
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Three shifts occurred in Windsor. First, the legal homosexual is now consistently represented as a "same-sex couple" or a "same-sex marriage," while the term "homosexual" has virtually disappeared. 115 Second, the moral assessment of the legal homosexual has now crossed over from moral recognition to moral praise. Third, states that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples are now increasingly understood by the Court to be engaging in the opposite of pure morals legislation. Several states now confer dignity-a positive moral value-upon same-sex couples. But before turning to the the illegitimacy of judicial invalidation of a statute without sufficient warrant in the Constitution. See id. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112 Cf. Harcourt, Gay and Lesbian Free Zone, supra note 109, at 503-04 ("For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court's ruling is the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.") (footnote omitted [W] hat is most striking about the opinion . . . is the direct, clear way that the Court seems to understand why DOMA is such an egregious violation of the constitution's equality guarantee under the Fifth Amendment."). 118 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 95, at 29 (arguing that an "unusual [dignity-based] right to recognition . . . forms the basis of the Court's decision," and that a "right to recognition, standing alone, has never been part of our constitutional jurisprudence"). But see Young, supra note 116, at 47 ("The right of 'recognition' in Windsor, then, was not some untethered judicial creation, but rather an entitlement to federal recognition of state law rights created in the democratic exercise of the states' reserved powers. That right is utterly familiar-and fundamental."). 119 See Baude, supra note 116, at 155 ("Windsor contains a second theme as well . . . . The idea is that a state law recognizing or creating a marriage also creates a constitutional liberty interest."). 120 See id. 121 See NeJaime, supra note 116, at 220 ("Indeed, if we look more closely at Windsor, we see that it is conceptually, if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case. Justice Ken-[Vol. 37 dignity. While equal protection language and precedents appear throughout the decision, 122 these combine with federalism and dignity, as captured in the majority's conclusion:
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
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Here we see how these three elements of Windsor (federalism, dignity, and equality) merge. This is a federalism decision in the sense that the Court recognizes the historic priority of the states in defining and regulating civil marriages.
124 When a state defines who can enter marriages within its boundaries, the federal government must show deference to such a decision. 125 The concept of dignity is closely tied to this point. 126 The State, according to Windsor, can decide whether or not to grant dignity to same-sex couples by recognizing their marriages. 127 A state decision to confer dignity results in nedy, writing for the majority, repeatedly sketches the contours of the right to marry in relation to same-sex couples."). 122 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) ("What the State of New York treats as alike the federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect."); see also id. ("DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State . . . ."). The decision also held that discriminations "of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision," id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)), and that the "Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group," id. at 2693 (citing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). 123 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added). 124 See id. at 2691-92. 125 See id. at 2693. 126 See id. at 2695-96; see also id. at 2691 ("The significance of state responsibilities for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation's beginning; for 'when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.' ") (quoting Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930)). 127 Id. at 2692 ("The dynamics of state government in the federal system are to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other," and "[w]hen the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way [i.e. marriage equality], its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community."). N] either Windsor nor Hollingsworth forces any action upon the states, some of which continue to have large majorities opposed to gay marriage. . . . Windsor did not challenge the constitutionality of section 2 of DOMA, which authorizes states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. Such rulings are unlikely to generate any significant backlash."). 134 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("To the extent that the Court takes the position that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level, I wholeheartedly agree. I hope that the Court will ultimately permit the people of each State to decide this question for themselves."); id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]hile I disagree with the result to which the majority's analysis leads it in this case, I think it more important to point out that its analysis leads no further. The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of their 'historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,' . . . may continue to utilize the traditional definition of Part III will criticize Windsor's "weak dignity" for reasons wholly different from those of the Windsor dissenters. Let us see now, however, why Windsor should be understood as the culmination of the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.
The "Same-Sex Couple"
In Windsor, the legal homosexual turned into a "same-sex couple." The majority introduced the plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and her deceased spouse, Thea Spyer, as "[t]wo women then resident in New York [who] were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007." 135 Edith and Thea appear in Windsor by reference to their biological sex ("two women") and not their sexuality (two lesbians). Although their sexual relationship began in the 1960s, many years before they were to become "[t]wo women . . . married in a lawful ceremony,"
136 the Court portrays their 2007 marriage as the landmark of their lives. 137 The glaring absence of references to sexuality and sexual orientation in the Court's decision is not particular to descriptions of Edith and Thea. Throughout Windsor, the terms "homosexual" and "lesbian" are replaced with "same-sex couples" and "same-sex marriage." 138 The word "lesbian" does not appear in the majority's decision even once. 139 With this rhetorical transition to "same-sex couples" and "same-sex marriage," Windsor erased the "lesbian" and the "homosexual" in what is, to this point, the most important Court decision in the decade for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights.
As various scholars have observed, the Court in Romer had erased bisexuals, present in the statute at issue, from the definition of the class vindicated by the decision in the case. 140 139 The term appears for the first time in quoted material in Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Likewise, the word "gay" appears only in the dissenting opinions, e.g. id. at 2708, and the words "homosexual" and "homosexuality" in the majority opinion appear only in quoted material referring to the House of Representatives' enactment of DOMA in 1996, id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 140 143 In an article by that name, Yoshino argues that self-identified homosexuals and heterosexuals seek to erase bisexual identity because, among other reasons, they have a shared "interest in defending norms of monogamy." 144 Romer is just one instance of this widespread phenomenon.
What the Court did in Windsor is even more striking. For the Court in Windsor to erase the terms "homosexual," "lesbian," and "gay" is culturally anomalous. This move nonetheless fits well within the logic of the Court's decision. Windsor seems to leave us with a new binary: married/nonmarried. For this binary, sexual orientation does not matter. Those who are married, as we will now see, are granted dignity through marriage licenses, while those who are not are left without that blessing.
Moral Dignity of Married "Same-Sex" Couples
You know the Catholic hierarchy has been awful, but the Catholic people and the families and friends and people who care as Jesus did about the marginalized and treating them with dignity . . . I think Jesus is weeping for joy.
-Andrew Sullivan (CNN interview with Anderson Cooper) 145 Windsor is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex marriage is legally recognized, is portrayed as a morally dignified person. As Justice groups that most concertedly ignore bisexual existence. If the subject surfaces at all in these cases, it is same-sex marriage opponents who raise it. However fleeting and infrequent, conservative invocations of bisexuality shed light on the reasons for 'LGBT' advocates' meticulous avoidance of the subject.") (footnote and citation omitted); Kenji (1996) . 143 Yoshino, supra note 140, at 362; see also id. ("It is as if these two groups, despite their other virulent disagreements, have agreed that bisexuals will be made invisible. I call this the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. To support the existence of such a contract, I adduce evidence that self-identified straights and self-identified gays both deploy the same three strategies of bisexual erasure: class erasure, individual erasure, and delegitimation."). 144 Id. 146 By granting them the responsibilities and rights of marriage, states "conferred upon [same-sex couples] a dignity and status of immense import," 147 and "enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community."
148 Section 3 of DOMA took all of that away, 149 and was thus declared unconstitutional. 150 The Windsor decision assumes that marriage makes the legal homosexual more moral, and that the State affirms this by granting marriage licenses. Unfortunately, Windsor does not explain how marriage licenses elevate the moral status of those who marry. What makes marriage licenses any different from drivers' licenses or fishing licenses? 151 Why do licenses for driving or fishing not confer dignity on those who obtain them? One cannot reasonably claim, for instance, that the "responsibilities, as well as rights," that come with a fishing license "enhance the dignity and integrity of the person."
152 Such a claim would be meaningful only in a legal culture where fishing is an activity of great moral significance. 153 Two rationales have appeared in the last two decades to support the idea of moral elevation through marriage: One can be characterized as sacralizing (the "sacralizing rationale") and the other as normalizing (the "normalizing rationale"). While Windsor does not explicitly rely on either rationale, the repeated assertion that marriage enhances dignity is hardly intelligible without them. I will briefly introduce each rationale.
Under the sacralizing rationale, as Michael Warner has aptly observed, both sides of the same-sex marriage debates "seek from state-sanctioned The union of two people contemplated by [the Massachusetts statute] "is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."
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In characterizing civil marriage as sacred and noble, Goodridge echoed Griswold, where the Court justified the constitutional right to privacy through the sanctity of the marital bedroom. 158 Windsor does not tell us how or why marriage enhances the dignity of those who enter it, but the perception of marriage as sacred provides one of the strongest conceptual links to human dignity. Under the sacralizing rationale, marriage enhances the moral dignity of the married legal homosexual because the institution itself is sacred. he opponents of same-sex marriage are generally more explicit-outside the courtroom, at least-that sacralization is what they are after," and that, on the other side, marriage equality advocates "more typically describe an effect of sacralization in nominally secular terms, such as 'special status' and 'transcendent significance'"). 155 See Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 18, archived at http://perma.cc/WCV6-A3F6 (arguing for abolition of "state endorsement of the sanctified religious wedding" or for "ending the use of the term 'marriage' altogether"). 156 1, 12 (1967) (describing the freedom to marry as a right that "has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" and which is "fundamental to our very existence and survival"); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (describing marriage as "an institution more basic in our civilization than any other").
159 Accordingly, some critics have suggested that states should abolish civil marriage altogether and leave the business of sacralizing unions to religious institutions. See, e.g., By contrast, the normalizing rationale is not theological in essence. It is motivated by the more modern necessity to govern large populations effectively. This twofold normalizing rationale centers on how same-sex marriage can potentially (1) facilitate more efficient state governance of same-sex couples and their children, and (2) "improve" the moral behavior of individual homosexual actors. The former is more functional and can hardly be linked with morality or dignity; the latter cannot be understood without them. I will briefly explain.
For the view of marriage as necessary for efficient governance, Goodridge is again exemplary:
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is central to the way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic data.
160
Civil marriage anchors social order. 161 It helps the government with its primary task of managing the population; it provides a useful structure for distributing property and immigration benefits, ordering the private care of children and adults, and controlling disease.
162
More importantly, the second part of the normalizing rationale is of crucial significance for the metamorphosis traced here. A well-known argument that marriage could morally improve the sexual behavior of homosexuals was offered by Andrew Sullivan in Virtually Normal.
163 Sullivan famously announced a new era of homosexual politics, in which homosexuals will be integrated into the two most important public institutions: the structured, publicly-proclaimed, communally-supported relationship of mutual commitment-should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no legal definition or status."); Douglas W. Kmiec & Shelley Ross Saxer, Equality in Substance and in Name, S.F. GATE (Mar. 2, 2009, 4:00 a.m.), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Equality-in-substance-and-in-name-3249218.php, archived at http://perma.cc/6W7X-4VT5 (recommending that the California Supreme Court "direct the state to employ non-marriage terminology for all couples-be it civil union or some equivalent" and explaining that this "dovetails with the court's important responsibility to reaffirm the unfettered freedom of all faiths to extend the nomenclature of marriage as their traditions allow."). 160 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. See also id. at 965 ("That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit."). 161 
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Conferring Dignity 267 military and civil marriage. 164 Marriage especially "is the highest public recognition of personal integrity." 165 Without it, sexuality is on the loose. 166 In a disturbing (yet telling) allusion, Sullivan predicted that marriage would be the first step toward the resolution of "the homosexual question."
167 Sullivan's idealization of personal monogamous commitments, which has been subject to extensive scholarly scrutiny, 168 has also echoed in judicial recognition of same-sex marriages. 169 Without explicitly relying on either the sacralizing or normalizing rationales, Windsor articulated a direct causal link between civil marriage and an elevated moral recognition of same-sex couples. Windsor thus completed the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual into a morally good legal actor. This did not escape the well-attuned radar of Justice Scalia, who harshly criticized the majority for "clums[il]y" stepping into a debate that should be resolved through democratic means.
170 Justice Scalia criticized the majority's decision 164 See id. at 178 (arguing that the centerpiece for this new politics, "[t]he critical measure for this politics of public equality-private freedom is . . . equal access to civil marriage."). 165 Id. at 179. See also id. at 182 (asserting that marriage "provides an anchor . . . in the maelstrom of sex and relationships to which we are all prone . . . [and it is] a mechanism for emotional stability and economic security"). 166 Id. at 182. ("[W]e recognize that not to promote marriage would be to ask too much of human virtue."). 167 Id. at 185 (arguing that gay marriage "is a profoundly humanizing, traditionalizing step. It is . . . more important than any other institution, since it is the most central institution to the nature of the problem, which is to say, the emotional and sexual bond between one human being and another."). 168 See 169 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954-55 ("Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. . . . Because it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition.") (emphasis added). Interestingly, this perception of marriage as a training camp for virtue has been applied to opposite-sex marriages as well. At least two courts since Lawrence have rejected same-sex marriage challenges under the theory that homosexuals cannot engage in "accidental procreation," and thus do not need marriage. for labeling opponents of same-sex marriage as "enemies of the human race" 171 and "haters of the neighbor." 172 Justice Scalia may have anticipated that Windsor would be read as the complete inversion of Bowers in this regard. 173 If in Bowers the legal homosexual was the morally condemned character, in Windsor the morally condemned character is the one who does not support same-sex marriage. This scandalous reversal now names as "haters of the neighbor" those who are religiously commanded to "love thy neighbor." Oddly (or perhaps not), in its invocation of that religious command, Justice Scalia's dissent converges with Andrew Sullivan's response to Windsor in the epigraph above.
174 "Jesus is weeping for joy," said Sullivan. The marginalized, stigmatized, shamed minority has been granted moral dignity. 175 It is now unchristian to oppose same-sex marriage.
"Positive" Morals Legislation
Like the Wizard of Oz, the State now marks the legal homosexual with dignity. 176 Interestingly, in the aftermath of Lawrence's "end of all morals legislation," 177 Windsor offers a new type of State morals legislation for the legal homosexual-one that comes in the form of moral praise. Under Windsor, states have the power to confer dignity by granting marriage licenses, and, by so doing, to confer positive moral value upon the legal (married) homosexual. Thus whereas it is no longer legitimate to prohibit some forms of private sexual conduct solely based on moral disapproval by the community, 178 it is quite possible, according to Windsor, to convey moral approval through marriage licensing. For many readers, this welcome development may not seem puzzling at all; it fits well with our liberal intuitions. But from a perspective of moral and legal transformation, positive morals legislation passion by good people on all sides. . . . Since DOMA's passage, citizens on all sides of the question have seen victories and they have seen defeats. There have been plebiscites, legislation, persuasion, and loud voices-in other words, democracy."). 171 Id. at 2709. 172 Id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the majority's telling, this story is blackand-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It is hard to admit that one's political opponents are not monsters . . . ."). 173 See id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("As I have observed before, the Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and sexual norms. . . . I will not swell the U.S. Reports with restatements of that point. It is enough to say that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.") (citing Lawrence v. 
II. THE CONDITIONS OF MORAL TRANSFORMATION
In Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin explored the idea that legal and social understandings of "good sex" and "bad sex" shift over time. 184 As Rubin explained, "[m]ost systems of sexual judgment-religious, psychological, feminist, or socialist-attempt to determine on which side of the line a particular act falls."
185 Acts that are considered good-but only those-"are accorded moral complexity."
186 But "sex acts on the bad side of the line are considered utterly repulsive and devoid of all emotional nuance."
187 Over the course of time, some acts or identities may shift over from the "bad sex" to the "good sex" side of the line. 188 For instance, "if [homosexuality] is coupled and monogamous," Rubin wrote in her 1984 essay, "society is beginning to recognize that it includes the full range of human interaction." 189 Rubin's theory beautifully captured what would happen to the legal homosexual in the decades to follow. As we saw above, in Bowers the legal homosexual was perceived by the Court as an immoral sexual sodomite, but by the time Windsor was decided, the legal homosexual had become a morally praiseworthy citizen. What did the legal homosexual have to acquire or abandon in order to be accorded moral nuance and complexity? This Part outlines three conditions that proved critical for placing homosexuality on the path to moral praise: (1) desexualization, (2) privatization, and (3) coupling and reproduction. I will discuss each in turn.
A. Bodies: Desexualization
The moral ascent of the legal homosexual over the last three decades has depended on the declining visibility of erotic acts. This reverse relation of sex to morality reflects what has been called "sex negativity," an attitude that treats human sexuality with suspicion, and " [v] irtually all erotic behavior [as] bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established." 185 Id. at 151. 186 Id. ("For instance, heterosexual encounters may be sublime or disgusting, free or forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does not violate other rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human experience."). 187 Id. 188 Id. ("As a result of the sex conflicts of the last decade, some behavior near the border is inching across it. Unmarried couples living together, masturbation, and some forms of homosexuality are moving in the direction of respectability . . . ."). 189 Id. at 154. 190 Id. at 148. ("This culture always treats sex with suspicion. . . . Sex is presumed guilty until proven innocent. Virtually all erotic behavior is considered bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established. The most acceptable excuses are marriage, reproduction, and love. Sometimes scientific curiosity, aesthetic experience, or a longterm intimate relationship may serve. But the exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence, curiosity, or creativity all require pretexts that are unnecessary for other pleasures, such as the enjoyment of food, fiction, or astronomy.").
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Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37 having illicit sex in Lawrence's bedroom. 201 But instead of discussing sex, the Court famously took sodomy out of the picture, asserting that the Bowers majority had mischaracterized the issue before it. 202 Lawrence reasoned that the problem with sodomy laws was that they "seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." 203 The issue was the liberty to engage in private intimate conduct. 204 Homosexual sex was now recast by the Court as intimate private acts.
Finally, in Windsor, we find the legal homosexual, this time two married women, stripped of their sexuality and sex acts altogether. In the documentary film, Edie & Thea: A Very Long Engagement, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer discuss their long and exceedingly erotic love story. 205 It is crystal clear, throughout this documentary, and in further interviews, that it was important for Edith and Thea to convey that sex was a meaningful part of their relationship. 206 As Edith Windsor tells fans, "Keep it hot!" was one of the couple's secrets to a long relationship. 207 The Supreme Court's version of their lives would not lead the reader to suspect any such thing. The Court's decision centers on the couple's 2007 marriage ceremony and lifelong commitment to each other. 208 The only longing captured by the Court's decision is the couple's "long [ing] 
B. Space: Privatization
The second condition on the path to moral praise involved a growing emphasis on the private legal homosexual. The legal homosexual is perceived as someone who has private (as opposed to public) sex, and lives a private, domesticated life. This perception crystallized in Lawrence. The Lawrence Court could have declared a liberty to engage in an unfettered sexual life. But it did not. It articulated a liberty to engage in private, consensual, homosexual intimacy. 215 As Justice Kennedy reasoned:
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. 216 The key words here are "their homes," "private lives," "intimate conduct," and "personal bond that is more enduring." 217 The Lawrence majority decriminalized homosexual sodomy, and at the same time confined it geographically to non-public spaces. This private notion of liberty, which Katherine Franke has called a "curious form of liberty," is "less expansive, rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated." 218 [Vol. 37
The spotlight on the private legal homosexual has also been prevalent in contemporary same-sex marriage litigation. 219 Interestingly, in Glorious Precedents: When Same-Sex Marriage Was Radical, Michael Boucai argues that the gay marriage challenges of the 1970s stand in sharp contrast to our current moment. 220 According to Boucai, these early plaintiffs did not advocate private sex, monogamy, or even long enduring commitments. 221 Their goal was not assimilation to bourgeois domesticity. 222 It was liberation. They wanted to pose a political challenge to a discriminatory institution.
223 These "glorious" precedents, all of which failed miserably in courts, 224 teach us that marriage equality litigation was not always pursued through the framework of private sex and domestic lives. Even more to the point, for the metamorphosis traced here, it is vital to see how privatization played a role in making the legal homosexual more intelligible-and at the end more moral-in the eyes of the Court.
C. Relationships: Coupling and Reproduction
In 1993, still in the shadow of Bowers, Mary Anne Case aptly observed that "the couple, the missing third term between the individual and the community, is an extremely suggestive absence from the [lesbian and gay] litigation history." 225 Case pointed out that the privacy right in Griswold v. Connecticut 226 was originally granted to the married couple who had sought to use contraceptives-not to individuals. 227 Accordingly, Case suggested that to establish a gay and lesbian "intimate association" right, "it may be necessary to go back to Griswold, i.e., to a strong pair bond." 228 This is because courts "have seen their enterprise with respect to heterosexuals in earlier cases as promoting pair bonding, not mere copulation." 229 The legal homosexual, suggested Case, had been losing some cases due to an absent pair bond. 230 In the sodomy cases, in particular, Case underscored that the plaintiffs often challenged sodomy statutes as individuals, not as couples. 231 For example, Hardwick challenged the Georgia statute by himself and not with his fellow sex-mate, and "this absence of a pair bond to go along with the copulating is what makes Hardwick, otherwise so ideal, an imperfect vehicle." 232 Case concluded that in some contexts, especially sodomy challenges, which are already sexualized, "a greater focus on pairbonding clearly has benefits that outweigh the risks." 233 Mary Anne Case's analysis indeed predicted the two later couples-oriented decisions in our metamorphosis: Lawrence and Windsor. As we saw above, these two cases were entirely oriented toward the couple. Gays (Lawrence) and lesbians (Windsor) now appear in the Court's rhetoric as couples or intimate bonds. This, as Case suggested over twenty years ago, has proved a winning strategy in both the sodomy and marriage contexts.
In addition to the same-sex couple already emergent in Lawrence, Windsor added children to the mix. Despite the fact that Edith and Thea never had children, 234 the children of same-sex couples are a key presence throughout the Windsor decision. The decision discusses, for instance, the humiliating effects of the Defense of Marriage Act on children, 235 the importance of committing in marriage before children, 236 and the difficulty "for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own fam-[Vol. 37
ily." 237 So in Windsor, in addition to the couple, the Court casts children and reproduction as characteristic of the legal homosexual. 238 In sum, we see that three conditions are at the core of the transition of the legal homosexual from an immoral sodomite to a dignified married couple. The legal homosexual is commonly perceived as desexualized, privatized, and coupled and reproductive.
III. INCOMPLETE CLOSURE: WINDSOR'S WEAK DIGNITY
The history of DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.
-Justice Kennedy, United States v. Windsor 239 The concept of human dignity is not new in the jurisprudence of the Court. It has been especially prominent in decisions authored by Justice Kennedy. 240 As Reva Siegel has observed, the normative meaning of human dignity varies from case to case, such that "[a]t different points . . . dignity concerns the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality." 241 In fact, dignity can sometimes support opposing normative positions. For instance, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court appealed to human dignity to justify government restriction of abortions, 242 whereas in Casey, the Court appealed to human dignity to support a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 243 What work does dignity do in Windsor? The discussion of Windsor in Part I examined the doctrinal significance of dignity in the Court's holding. 244 This Part argues that Windsor's dignity is weak for three principal reasons. First, it is conferred by the State and at each state's discretion. Second, Windsor's dignity is much narrower in scope than contemporary theories of dignity promoted by legal and moral philosophers. Third, Windsor's State-conferred dignity comes with unnecessary rhetoric of injured subjects, a rhetoric that could perpetuate an attachment to injury by homosexual couples and other rights-seeking legal subjects.
A. Weak Source: State-Conferred Dignity
The Windsor decision repeatedly affirms that the State is the source of human dignity. Upon arrival of what the Court calls "a new perspective, a new insight," 245 some states have decided to dignify same-sex couples by recognizing their marriages. This "conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import" 246 and "enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class."
247 This novel theory of State-conferred dignity is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, and more importantly, in contrast with God or his derivative institutions, the source of the State's authority to grant moral dignity is unclear. The State can grant liberal rights such as liberty and equality, but those, at least in their common use, are understood as secular liberal rights. They do not confer moral value on individuals. Windsor seems to locate the power to confer dignity in the formation of consensus within communities. 248 Namely, the State confers dignity after the local community has decided to accept a group of previously disapproved-of individuals. But if dignity is a serious human value, it should be guaranteed by the State, like equality and liberty, to all members of society. It should not have to wait for the moral approval of a majority of the population.
Second, it is unclear whether State-conferred dignity can travel across state lines. Under the Court's rendering, a state decision to recognize samesex marriages enhances the dignity of that class only "in their own community."
249 So if Amy and Emily marry in Iowa, a state that recognizes their marriage, they will be dignified in Iowa. But when they travel to the neighboring Nebraska, or to Georgia or Alabama, that dignity may have to stay behind, and their marriage may once again be undignified. 250 It is strange indeed to imagine losing one's dignity when crossing state lines. 245 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 246 Id. at 2692. 247 Id. 248 Id. at 2692-93 (discussing "the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other" and "the community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality"). 249 Id. at 2692. 250 See Baude, supra note 116, at 157 (arguing that "even if courts conclude that some form of interstate recognition is constitutionally required, not all recognitions are [Vol. 37
B. Weak Scope: A Narrow Theory of Human Dignity
Windsor's theory of State-conferred dignity is significantly narrower than other present and historical conceptions of human dignity. Human dignity has played an important role in international and national human rights movements, 251 and it has provided a basis for much theorizing about social justice. 252 To illuminate just how narrow Windsor's theory of State-conferred dignity is, let us briefly consider how moral philosophers have treated the concept of human dignity.
Dignity has received growing attention in contemporary moral philosophy and legal theory. For example, Martha Nussbaum's approach to justice is based on human dignity. Nussbaum has argued that respect for human dignity requires that governments should support central human "capabilities." 253 Nussbaum defines dignity as follows:
If something has dignity, as Kant put it well, it does not merely have a price: it is not merely something to be used for the ends of others, or traded on the market. This idea is closely linked to the idea of respect as the proper attitude toward dignity; indeed, rather than thinking of the two concepts as totally independent, so that we would first offer an independent account of dignity and then argue that dignity deserves respect (as independently defined), I
believe that we should think of the two notions as closely related, forming a concept-family to be jointly elucidated. 254 Dignity is ultimately bound up with respect, according to Nussbaum, and it is the responsibility of the liberal state to ensure this respect. The state does not grant dignity. Its only function is to safeguard it. 255 Jeremy Waldron has argued for a slightly different understanding of human dignity, connected to what he calls "responsibility-rights." 256 Waldron's concept of dignity draws upon the importance of social rank, but with a twist. 257 As he explains, "the idea of general human dignity associated itself [with] the notion that humans as such were a high-ranking species, called to a special vocation in the world, and that in a sense each of us was to be regarded as endued with a certain nobility or royalty, each of us was to be regarded as a creature of a high rank." 258 Waldron conceives current liberal societies as societies not without caste, but rather, "with just one caste and a very high caste at that: every man a Brahmin. Every man a duke, every woman a queen, everyone entitled to the sort of deference and consideration, everyone's person and body sacrosanct . . . ." 259 Given this elevated status of all individuals, a societal commitment to dignity must connect individual rights with social responsibilities toward others. 260 [Vol. 37
Both of these approaches, despite differences between them, conceptualize human dignity as something that all individuals possess and that society must protect, defend, and enhance. Under Nussbaum's approach, all humans have dignity and this translates into a set of obligations for modern states. 261 Under Waldron's approach, human dignity comes from dignitas, which is a rank that all citizens share in liberal democracies. 262 One need not accept either theory of dignity to agree that, if dignity is to be embraced as a social or legal value, it should not be understood to come from the State. Neither theory of dignity derives human dignity from State recognition. Waldron and Nussbaum's views usefully illustrate how far afield the Court's presentation of dignity is from contemporary philosophical accounts.
C. Weak Subjects: Windsor's Injured Subjects
The word that Kennedy used a lot was dignity . . . and when you are a kid and you figure out you're gay when you're seven years old . . . you don't know about sex or anything like that, but you do know that you'll never be able to have a life like your mom and dad. Be married. And that's a huge wound to some kids' self-esteem, identity, psychological pride, and that wound has been healed a little today. And I think of all the future people who will be less damaged and less wounded, will feel less pain . . . ."
-Andrew Sullivan, CNN interview with Anderson Cooper 263 United States v. Windsor tells the story of wounded and injured subjects. 264 The Defense of Marriage Act, according to Windsor, "demeans the couple, . . . whose relationship the State has sought to dignify." 265 It "imposes a disability on the class"; 266 it "places same-sex couples in an unstable
